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Recent Developments

Shapiro v. Shapiro:

R

eversing precedent, the
. Court of Appeals of
Maryland
ruled
on
the
interpretation of marital settlement
agreements in Shapiro v. Shapiro,
346 Md. 648, 697 A.2d 1342
(1997). The court held that marital
settlement agreement provisions
that are subject to modification
only under certain circumstances
cannot be modified by a judge
absent those requirements.
On May 4, 1988, Debra
Shapiro and David Shapiro
entered into a marital settlement
agreement (the "Agreement"),
which was later incorporated in
their judgment of divorce, that
provided for alimony and child
support to be paid to Mrs.
Section 5(e) of the
Shapiro.
Agreement stipulated that the
alimony payments were not to be
modified unless Mr. Shapiro
became
temporarily
or
permanently disabled, as defined
by Mr. Shapiro's insurance policy.
Sixteen months after the
divorce, Mr. Shapiro petitioned the
Circuit Court for Howard County
for a rescission or modification of
the Agreement. The court refused
to rescind the Agreement but held
that the provisions regarding
alimony were subject to court
modification in spite of the express
provision in the Agreement that
permitted modification only if Mr.
Shapiro became disabled.
The trial court based its
holding on Langley v. Langley, 88
Md. App. 535, 596 A.2d 89
(1991), where the' Court of Special
Appeals of Maryland held that
section
8-103(c)(2)
of the
Annotated Code of Maryland,

MARITAL
SETTLEMENT
AGREEMENTS
CONTAINING
PRECONDITIONS
FOR
MODIFICATION
MAY NOT BE
JUDICIALLY
MODIFIED
ABSENT THOSE
CIRCUMSTANCES
By Amy B. Tate
Family Law Article required a
specific provision stating that the
marital settlement agreement is
not subject to any court
modification. Thus, any agreement
without that specific language
would be subject to judicial
modification.
The court of special appeals
ruled that section 5(e) of the
marital settlement agreement did
not comply with the Lang/ey rule.
The court of appeals granted
certiorari to determine whether
section
8-103(c)(2)
requires
spousal support provisions to be
completely
modifiable
or
completely non-modifiable and
whether a court can rewrite a
marital settlement agreement
which is part of an enrolled
judgment,
absent fraud
or
mistake.
The court began its analysis
by examining the text of section 8103(c)(2), MD. CODE ANN., FAM.
LAw (1991). The court noted that

the term "provision" is used both in
the singular and the plural. Id. at
655, 697 A.2d at 1345. Pursuant
to the statute, a "provision" may
be included in a marital settlement
agreement for the purpose of
addressing
"provisions
with
respect to alimony or spousal
support are not subject to any
court modification." Id. at 656, 697
A.2d 1346 (citing MD. CODE ANN.,
FAM. LAW § 8-103(c)(2)(1991».
The circuit court interpreted the
latter phrase to include all
prOVIsions regarding spousal
support, a position which Mr.
Shapiro said could be justified by
the use of the singular in
reference to the modification
provision. Id. at 656, 697 A.2d at
1346.
While Mr. Shapiro advocated
this bright line approach, Ms.
Shapiro
contended
that
modifiability should be determined
provision by provision and that the
lower courts should have adopted
that construction. Id. Rather than
choosing either version, the court
referred to Article I, section 8 of
the Rules of Interpretation which
states that "[t]he singular always
includes the plural, and vice
versa." Id. at 657, 697 A.2d at
1346 (quoting MD. CODE. ANN. art.
1 § 8(1996». The court found that
either way, the statute is still
ambiguous
regarding
court
modification. Id.
The court then turned to the
legislative history of section 8-103.
It observed that subsections (b)
and (c) of section 8-103 were
enacted to correct technical
barriers to divorcing parties that
prevented inclusion of their
express
intent
in
marital

28.1 U. BaIt. L.F. 45

Recent Developments
settlement agreements. Id. at
658, 697 A.2d 1347. Subsection
8-103(b) was enacted in 1975 to
nullify the rule of Simpson v.
Simpson. Id. (citing Simpson v.
Simpson, 18 Md. App. 626, 308
A.2d 410 (1973». In Simpson, the
court of special appeals ruled that
a court could modify technical
alimony but not contractual
Id.
The
spousal sLipport.
General Assembly responded with
Chapter 849 of the Acts of 1975
which stated:
"the court shall have the right
to modify such deed or
agreement ... regardless of
the manner in which the
provisions are expressed or
stated unless the provisions
... specifically state that they
are not subject to any court
modification."
Id. at 659, 697 A.2d at 1347
(quoting MD. ANN CODE. art. 16
§28 (1973».
This provision was in effect for the
first three months of 1976, after
which it was replaced by Chapter
170 of the Acts of 1976. Id. at
659,697 A.2d at 1347-48. Unlike
the prior statute, the 1976 Act
restricted the court's ability to
modify the settlement agreement
provisions concerning spousal
support to those agreements in
which there were no express
waiver or statements specifically
precluding court modification. Id.
at 660, 697 A.2d at1348.
In 1984, the Family Law Article
was revised and the acts of 1975
and 1976 were adopted as
sections 8-103(b) and 8-103(c).
The court suggested that the 1984
code Revisors' use of the phrase
"unless there is" in the sections
addressing modification or waiver
of spousal support necessitated a
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grammatical change from plural to
singular. Id. at 661, 697 A.2d at
1349. As such, the court found no
justification for the lower court's
bright line construction of section
8-103(c)(2). Id. at 662,697 A.2d
at 1349. The court proffered that
the grammatical change indicated
the legislature did not consider the
consequences of the new
language. Id. In addition, the
Revisor's Note indicated no
substantive change was intended.
Id. As a result, the court then
focused
on
the
General
Assembly's intent in enacting the
provision. Id. at 663, 697 A.2d at
1349.
In
enacting
section
8103(c)(2), the court noted, the
legislature sought to permit judicial
modification
of
contractual
support, unless otherwise agreed
by the spouses.
Id.
The
distinction between technical
alimony and contractual support
would no longer contradict the
parties intent. Id. By requiring a
"blanket provision" that prevents
modification of spousal support
provisions except in an all or
nothing manner, the court opined,
"the evil that the General
Assembly sought to cure by 8103(c)(2) is recreated." Id. at 663,
697 A.2d at 1349-50. In fact, the
court found no support for the
continuation of the all or nothing
approach. Id.
The court supported its
conclusion by referring to decades
of public policy recognizing the
ability of a husband and a wife to
enter into an agreement relating to
alimony and support. Id. at 66364, 697 A.2d at 1350. It further
stated that "[t)he broad, validating
approach of § 8-101(a) is
inconsistent with restrictively

reading § 8-1 03( c)(2) to require
that the contractual support
provisions . .. be modifiable or
non-modifiable as a class." Id. at
664, 697 A.2d at 1350.
The court of appeals refuted
Mr. Shapiro's assertion that the
legislature preferred the all or
nothing approach so as to allow
the application of factors for
setting spousal support under
section 11-106(b) of the Family
Law Article. Id. at 665, 697 A.2d
at 1350-51. Those factors include
the existence of "any agreement
between the parties" and "the
financial resources and financial
needs of each party". Id. (quoting
MD. CODE. ANN., FAM. LAW §11106(b». The court pointed out
that a court would be free to apply
those factors "if and when that
other circumstance occurs and the
parties come to the court for
modification." Id.
After applying the rules of
statutory construction, the court
found the legislative history to be
inconsistent with the all or nothing
approach. Id. The court held that
the alimony provisions in the
Shapiro agreement could not be
judicially modified because Mr.
Shapiro was not disabled. Id. at
665, 697 A.2d at 1351. As a
result, the court overturned
Langley as it was inconsistent with
its present finding that provisions
could be individually exempted
from modification by the court. Id.
The court of appeals also
addressed the circuit court's
conversion of the Agreement's
alimony provisions to child support
provIsions. Id. at 665-66, 697
A.2d at 1351.
Because the
Agreement was incorporated into
the judgment for divorce, the court
observed that it could only be
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modified in the case of fraud,
mistake, or irregularity. Id. at 666,
697 A.2d at 1351 (citing Maryland
Rule 2-535(b». While section 8105(b) does permit retroactive
modification of a divorce decree,
the section only applies to
provisions subject to modification
under section 8-103. Id. Since
the court's holding prevented
modification of the alimony
provision under section 8-103, the
power to modify the Shapiro's
decree could not be invoked under
section 8-105(b). Id. The court
remanded the case to the circuit

court on the issue of child support
because the decrease in child
support was offset by alimony
payments, now impermissible
under the court's holding. Id.
The
Shapiro
decision
represents a dramatic shift in the
interpretation of family law. In
overturning Langley, the Court of
Appeals of Maryland created
greater flexibility in the drafting of
mar.ital settlement agreements in
Maryland.
By removing the
restrictive
interpretation
of
Langley,
spousal
support

provisions can be crafted to meet
a number of contingencies under
which modification of support may
occur. In addition, the Shapiro
decision is consistent with the
legislative purpose of section 8to
eliminate the
103( c)(2):
technical difficulties of contracts
between spouses. As a result,
family law practitioners may
consider future possibilities for the
husband and wife, without fear
that the product of their
negotiations will be subject to
judicial modification.
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